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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This action was brought before the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("the IDEA" or "the 
Act"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.  It raises an important question 
regarding the enforceability of settlement agreements made 
between parents and school boards with the intent of enforcing 
the IDEA.  On appeal, the East Brunswick Board of Education ("the 
Board") challenges the district court's order granting summary 
judgment against it.  The district court held the Board liable 
for the cost of providing personal aides for D.R., a disabled 
person, pursuant to the requirements of the IDEA.  The Board 
claims that the district court erred when it set aside a binding 
settlement agreement voluntarily entered by the parties.  The 
district court acknowledged that enforcement of the settlement 
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agreement would have required it to reach an opposite conclusion. 
 We review the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment de novo, "applying the same standard as the 
district court."  Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 
231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995); see W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (applying plenary review standard to summary judgment 
order in context of IDEA dispute).   In making this de novo 
review, we recognize that we must give "due weight" to the 
underlying state administrative proceedings.  Board of Education 
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).  The Third Circuit has 
interpreted the Supreme Court's instruction in Rowley to require 
that a court "consider -- although not necessarily to accept -- 
the administrative fact findings."  Carlisle Area School v. Scott 
P., 62 F.3d 520, 529 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 
116 S.Ct. 1419 (1996).  In addition, we must "view the underlying 
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion."  Babbitt, 63 F.3d at 
236. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the appeal from a final decision by an administrative law judge 
("ALJ") pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) & (2).  We have 
jurisdiction to review the district court's final order granting 
summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We conclude that the settlement agreement was 
improperly voided by the district court.  On the facts of this 
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particular case, the settlement agreement was voluntarily and 
willingly entered by the parties.  It is therefore a binding 
contract between the parties and should have been enforced as 
written.  Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the parents of 
the child are responsible for all additional services not 
contemplated by the parties at the time of settlement.  We will 
therefore reverse the opinion of the district court and grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Board.  However, we emphasize 
that our holding is limited to the facts of this case and should 
not be read to extend beyond this case and this agreement. 
 I. 
 D.R. is a multiply handicapped individual classified by 
the New Jersey Board of Education as in need of special 
education.  He was diagnosed at age two with Athetoid Ataxic 
Cerebral Palsy and moderate retardation.  D.R. is now twenty-one 
years old, but his adaptive behavior is estimated to be at the 
preschool level.  The parties agree that D.R. has difficulty 
performing simple daily tasks by himself.  He has difficulty 
walking, dressing, and toileting without assistance.  In the 
classroom, he often regresses into a hypnotic rocking behavior 
and must be constantly monitored by an assistant in order to 
engage him in classroom activity. 
 At age 4, D.R. began attending day school at the 
Cerebral Palsy Center ("CPC") in New Jersey, where he remained 
until January of 1992.  While at CPC, D.R. resided with his 
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parents in East Brunswick, New Jersey.  During the first semester 
of the 1991-92 school year, D.R.'s parents became convinced that 
he was not progressing at CPC and should be enrolled in a 
residential program.  In December 1991, D.R.'s parents filed a 
petition with the New Jersey Department of Education requesting a 
due process hearing under the IDEA.  The petition alleged that 
the CPC program was not appropriate for D.R. and that he would 
benefit from a transfer to the Benedictine School, an out-of-
state residential school in Ridgely, Maryland. 
 The Board, however, disagreed that residential 
placement was necessary for D.R.  His parents then in early 
January 1992 unilaterally placed him at the Benedictine School.  
 The Benedictine School informed D.R.'s parents at that time that 
their son's acceptance in the program was on a "trial basis" that 
would last for five weeks.  They were told that the proposed 
program might be modified depending on D.R.'s adaptation to his 
new circumstances.  The Board now complains that it was never 
informed of the "trial" nature of D.R.'s acceptance at 
Benedictine nor that the program in which he was placed was 
subject to modification. 
 Before D.R.'s trial period was complete, his parents 
and the Board met at a mediation conference and entered a 
settlement agreement.  The parties agreed that: 
1)The East Brunswick Board of Education will compensate placement 
costs at the Benedictine School for D.R. at an 
annual rate of $27,500 prorated for the balance of 
the 1991-2 school year including summer of 1992 
and beginning January 1, 1992; 
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2)For the 1992-93 school year the Board will contribute 90% of 
any increase over the 1991-92 rate. 
 
3)The Board will be absolved of any other or further costs based 
upon this placement, related service, or 
transportation in connection therewith. 
App. 408. 
 During D.R.'s first semester at Benedictine, the school 
"practically" provided one-to-one assistance.  Classes were small 
in size, with a high ratio of assistants and teachers to 
students; weekend and residential staff was able to provide the 
personal help that D.R. needed with daily functions.  Later in 
the adaptation process, however, the school felt that it could 
not continue to expend such resources on D.R. without neglecting 
its other students.  The school informed D.R.'s parents that D.R. 
would not be allowed to re-enroll for the 1992-93 school year 
unless personal aides were provided. 
 In April of 1992, the Board received a cost estimate 
from the Benedictine School for the 1992-93 school year.  The 
tuition totalled $62,487 -- more than double the amount provided 
by the settlement agreement.  In addition to the amount that the 
Board had agreed to pay in 1992-93, the estimate charged the 
Board for the services of a special classroom aide and a special 
residential aide, each at a cost of $16,640. 
 The Board refused to pay any portion of the cost of the 
personal aides.  It asserted that, under paragraph 3 of the 
settlement agreement, the cost of the aides were "related 
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service[s]" for which the Board was not liable.  D.R.'s parents 
disagreed and requested a hearing before a New Jersey 
Administrative Law Judge.  They sought an order that D.R. was in 
need of residential placement, that personal aides were 
necessary, that the current placement at Benedictine was 
appropriate, and that the Board was required to pay for the cost 
of the placement and the necessary aides. 
 At the hearing, the Board moved for dismissal on 
grounds that the settlement agreement was binding and that under 
the agreement the Board was not liable for the cost of the aides. 
 The ALJ agreed.  She dismissed D.R.'s petition, finding the 
settlement agreement to be binding and determinative. 
 D.R.'s parents did not appeal this ruling but instead 
requested a hearing before the New Jersey Department of 
Education.  In response, the Board argued that only a few weeks 
earlier, the same parties debated the same issues before a 
different ALJ who had dismissed the petition.  The ALJ agreed 
with the Board and concluded that D.R.'s second petition was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
 D.R.'s parents appealed the ALJ's decision barring 
their claim on grounds of res judicata to the U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.  Both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  On the basis of the pleadings and briefs submitted, 
the court concluded that the settlement agreement was binding.  
D.R. by M.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 184, 
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195 (D.N.J. 1993).  It found that the language of the agreement 
was unambiguous and required only that the Board pay for 90% of 
any increase in the cost of an array of services provided the 
previous year.  Because personal aides were not within the array 
of services previously provided, the district court held that the 
Board would not be liable for the cost of the aides under the 
terms of the settlement agreement, unless D.R.'s personal 
circumstances had changed since the parties entered the 
agreement.  Id. at 190-91 & 194. 
 The district court therefore remanded the case to an 
ALJ to determine whether D.R.'s personal circumstances changed 
following the closing of the agreement.  Id. at 195-96.  If the 
ALJ found that D.R.'s circumstances had changed such that the 
services provided by the agreement no longer satisfied the 
requirements of the IDEA, the court instructed that the agreement 
could not bind the parties and should be invalidated.  Id. at 
194.  The Board would then be liable under the IDEA for the cost 
of the personal aides for the 1992-93 school year. 
 On remand, the ALJ first concluded that during the 
1992-93 school year, one-to-one assistance was effectively 
provided by the School and was "educationally necessary and 
consistent with the IDEA."  He then found that because D.R.'s 
disability had not changed, his "personal circumstances" had not 
changed.  As a result, the ALJ again ruled in favor of the Board, 
holding that the settlement agreement was binding and that the 
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Board was not liable for the cost of the additional aides. 
 D.R.'s parents appealed this decision to the district 
court, seeking reversal of the ALJ's order.  Again, both parties 
moved for summary judgment.  The district court concluded that 
the record supported the ALJ's finding that a one-to-one aide was 
"educationally necessary and consistent with the IDEA."  Mem. Op. 
at 13.  It held that this finding dictated the outcome of the 
case.  Applying the Supreme Court's interpretation of the IDEA, 
the district court concluded that states receiving federal funds 
under the Act must provide services that are  "necessary to 
permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction."  Mem. Op. at 
5 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89).  The district court thus 
concluded that New Jersey could not refuse to provide 
educationally necessary services.  Such necessary services are 
the right of the disabled individual and cannot be waived by a 
contract to provide something less.   
 As a result, the district court held the Board liable 
for the cost of the personal aides for the 1992-93 school year, 
which amount was to be established by agreement between the 
parties.  Following the judgment, D.R.'s parents moved for an 
award of attorneys' fees and related costs as "prevailing 
parties" in the litigation.  A few days later, the Board filed a 
notice of appeal.  The Board then moved to stay the motion for 
attorneys' fees filed by D.R.'s parents, pending the outcome of 
this appeal.  D.R.'s parents did not oppose the Board's motion, 
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and the court granted a stay on the matter of attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
 II. 
 The district court set aside the settlement agreement 
based on its finding that D.R.'s circumstances had changed since 
the parties entered the agreement.  In finding changed 
circumstances, the district court rejected the conclusions of the 
state administrative law judge.  The court held that, because 
D.R.'s circumstances had changed, the personal aides had become 
"educationally necessary" for him to obtain an appropriate 
education as guaranteed by the IDEA.  The court found that the 
settlement agreement improperly excused the Board from its duty 
to provide educationally necessary services, and it therefore 
concluded that the agreement did not meet the IDEA's mandatory 
standards.  As a result, the district court invalidated the 
agreement and placed liability for the cost of the personal aides 
on the Board. 
 We believe that the district court erred when it found 
that D.R.'s circumstances changed following settlement.  Instead, 
we find that the only change that occurred in this case appeared 
on the bill sent by the Benedictine School to the Board.  There 
was no change in D.R.'s individual circumstances; he continued to 
need individual assistance in toileting, dressing, grooming, and 
eating.  The only circumstance that changed was that Benedictine 
decided that its staff could not maintain the level of 
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individualized attention that D.R. was receiving at the 
negotiated price.  The School decided that additional help was 
needed to deal with D.R.'s unchanged condition, increasing the 
total cost of services provided by the School. 
 Once a school board and the parents of a disabled child 
finalize a settlement agreement and the board agrees to pay a 
certain portion of the school fees, the parents should not be 
allowed to void the agreement merely because the total cost of 
the program subsequently increases.  A party enters a settlement 
agreement, at least in part, to avoid unpredictable costs of 
litigation in favor of agreeing to known costs.  Government 
entities have additional interests in settling disputes in order 
to increase the predictability of costs for budgetary purposes.   
 We are concerned that a decision that would allow 
parents to void settlement agreements when they become 
unpalatable would work a significant deterrence contrary to the 
federal policy of encouraging settlement agreements.  See 
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, ---, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 
1468 (1994) ("Public policy wisely encourages settlements.").  
Settlement agreements are encouraged as a matter of public policy 
because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and 
lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by courts.  In 
this case, public policy plainly favors upholding the settlement 
agreement entered between D.R.'s parents and the Board. 
 We agree that reaching a settlement agreement during 
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mediation, rather than during litigation, does not lessen the 
binding nature of the agreement on the parties.  See D.R. by 
M.R., 838 F. Supp. at 190.  When the parties entered the 
settlement agreement at issue in this case, they entered a 
contract.  In re Columbia Gas System, Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("In a nonbankruptcy context, we have treated a 
settlement agreement as a contract."); see also Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 318 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990); New York State Elec. & Gas 
Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 875 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1989).  We will 
therefore enforce the agreement as a binding contract voluntarily 
entered by both parties.2 
 When D.R.'s parents appealed the ALJ's decision to 
dismiss on grounds of res judicata, the district court noted 
that, if D.R.'s circumstances had not changed since settlement, 
the settlement agreement was binding on the parties.  D.R. v. 
M.R., 838 F. Supp. at 195.  It also held that, if the contract 
was to be enforced as binding, the terms of the agreement were 
"clear and unambiguous."  Id. at 190.  Under the agreement and as 
a matter of law, for the 1992-93 school year, the Board was 
responsible for 90% of any increase in the cost of services 
provided during the 1991-92 school year.  The additional services 
of personal aides were not provided during the 1991-92 term.  Nor 
                     
     
2
 We emphasize again, however, that in other cases where different facts are at issue, 
compelling public policy reasons may require a different conclusion. 
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was the cost of personal aides contemplated by the parties in 
negotiating the agreement.  Thus, the district court held that, 
if enforced, the contract clearly required that D.R.'s parents 
pay the cost of the aides' services provided during the 1992-93 
school year. 
 We agree that this is the proper reading of the 
settlement.  Because we conclude that D.R.'s circumstances have 
not changed and that the settlement agreement is therefore 
binding on the parties, we hold that the district court reading 
of the "clear and unambiguous" terms of the agreement applies.  
The Board is not liable for the cost of the personal aides 
provided for D.R. during the 1992-93 term.   As a consequence, it 
is not necessary for us to remand the case for the district 
court's determination.3 
 Finally, it is apparent that the motion filed by D.R.'s 
parents seeking attorneys' fees and costs as prevailing parties 
                     
     
3
 Unlike the situation in Miller Tabak Hirsch v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F.3d7 (2d Cir. 1996), cited 
by the dissent, there is no contention here that the settlement 
agreement violated federal law when it was executed.  The issue 
before the district court was change of circumstances; if D.R.’s 
circumstances had not changed, the agreement would be valid.  
Moreover, the settlement here resolved the dispute between the 
parties of whether D.R. required residential or day care.  The 
fact that the Board ceded its position that day care was adequate 
under IDEA by agreeing to a fixed amount of residential care does 
not mean that the Board was not providing funding that was 
sufficient to furnish day care for D.R. that would satisfy IDEA. 
 If this type of settlement is not permitted, we will deprive 
educators of needed room to compromise in resolving IDEA 
disputes.   
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must fail.  "[A] plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the 
merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship 
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a 
way that directly benefits the plaintiff."  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 
U.S. 103, 112 (1992); see also Wheeler v. Towanda Area School 
District, 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991); E.M. v. Millville Bd. 
of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D.N.J. 1994).  D.R.'s parents 
have not prevailed on their claim, nor have they obtained the 
relief they sought.  They are thus not entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees or costs under § 1415 of IDEA.  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(4)(B). III. 
 For the above reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order, and we will grant summary judgment in favor of the 
appellant. 
  
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
 I respectfully dissent. 
 Both the administrative law judge and the district 
court found that one-on-one assistance was "educationally 
necessary" for D.R.'s development.  Although the ALJ found D.R.'s 
personal circumstances had not changed, the district court 
reversed, holding the settlement could not satisfy IDEA. 
 Whether or not the change in Benedictine's funding 
policy should constitute a "change in circumstances" 
necessitating revision of the original agreement, Benedictine's 
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refusal to afford the same personal care for the same tuition 
charge meant D.R. no longer could receive the requisite amount of 
care contemplated under the settlement agreement.   
 The district court held that IDEA creates certain 
rights to educational assistance that cannot be waived by the  
guardians of a handicapped child and certain duties that cannot 
be bargained away by school boards.4  I agree and I would affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 
                     
4 A settlement agreement that violates a federal public policy or 
federal statute may be invalidated.  Miller Tabak Hirsch & Co. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, l0l F.3d 7, l0 (2d Cir. l996). 
 Because the state of New Jersey receives IDEA federal grant 
funds it must provide its handicapped citizens with the requisite 
educational assistance under the Act.  See Bd. of Ed. of East 
Windsor Regional Sch. Dist. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 99l (3d 
Cir. l986); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra USA, 
Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744-45 (lst Cir. l996). 
